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Abstract—Price instruments are useful in achieving market
balance conditions in various markets. Those instruments can
be also used for control of other composite systems. The for-
mulation and basic properties of the Price Method are re-
viewed and then the congestion control by price instruments
in a computer network is described and tested.
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1. Introduction
In this paper the objective is to present emerging, opportu-
nities to use price mechanisms for management of computer
networks. In recent years it was observed that the use of
the price instruments could be made both to propose the
new techniques for congestion control in data networks,
in particular for Internet congestion control (ICC), and to
better explain the existing congestion control mechanisms
(the current TCP (transmission control protocol) conges-
tion control protocols). It is useful to note at this point
that Internet pricing is essential not only for better pos-
sible understanding of the network operation but it may
also provide means to achieve rational behavior of the net-
work users, who otherwise may “overgraze” the existing
resources. Proper pricing of the network services is also
necessary for many other purposes, not only for congestion
control [1], [2]. Dynamic pricing may be useful, in partic-
ular, for balancing demand for access to application servers
and for proper valuation of diﬀerent classes and qualities
of service [3].
2. Price Method; General Formulation
and the Basic Facts
The Price Method, also known under the name of the
Interaction Balance Method [4]–[7] represents a versatile
approach to modeling, optimization and management of
complex systems. This follows the natural role played by
prices on various markets – to achieve the balance between
the demand and the supply. The method allows for various
problem formulations and price adjustment (price coordi-
nation) strategies. Problem formulation may either result
from a formal partitioning (decomposition) of a large-scale
optimization problem or it may result from more practical,
application case-oriented, considerations. Price adjustment
strategies can be derived from dual function optimization,
from solving sets of the coordinating conditions or from
practical possibilities existing in a particular application.
Consider the following, fairly general, deterministic prob-
lem related to complex system optimization:
max
x,u,y ∑i Ui(xi,ui,yi) , (1)
subject to xi ∈ Ii, i = 1, . . . ,N , (2)
yi = Fi(xi,ui) and ui = ∑
j
Hi jy j, i, j = 1, . . . ,N , (3)
∑
i
rli(xi)≤ cl, l = 1, . . . ,L . (4)
In the above formulation the objective is to maximize the
aggregate utility across N involved entities (system ele-
ments); xi is the vector of local decision variables (of di-
mension nxi), ui is the local (vector) interaction input (dim
ui = nui) and yi (dim yi = nyi) is the local interaction out-
put of the ith system element. In Eq. (3) it is assumed that
the interaction output yi is a unique deterministic function
of xi and ui, and that the interaction coupling constraints
ui = ∑ j Hi jy j are linear. Obviously, these relations can be
made more general. Similarly, local decision constraint
sets Ii can be imposed also on ui. Often these sets are
in form of box constraints Ii = [xmini ,xmaxi ] (with xmini being
the vector of lower bounds and xmaxi the vector of upper
bounds on the components of xi). Constraint (4) is the
global resource constraint; there are assumed to be L re-
sources which may be required by the local entities; rli(xi)
represents the consumption of the lth resource by system el-
ement i. It is assumed that the optimization problem (1)–(4)
has a solution.
The above optimization problem can be decomposed into
N parallel local problems by introducing prices (in math-
ematical terms Lagrange multipliers) λi (dim λi = nui),
i = 1, . . . ,N, associated with the coupling constraints ui =
∑ j Hi jy j, and µl , l = 1, . . . ,L, representing prices of the
global resources. The ith local problem is then deﬁned –
for given prices – as follows:
max
xi ,ui
[
Ui(xi,ui,yi)−λ Ti ui +
N
∑
j=1
λ Tj H jiyi−
L
∑
l=1
µlrli(xi)
]
, (5)
where yi = Fi(xi,ui) and subject to xi ∈ Ii. Assuming unique
solutions to the above N problems, xi(λ ,µ), ui(λ ,µ)
and yi(λ ,µ), (where yi(λ ,µ) = Fi(xi(λ ,µ),ui(λ ,µ)) and
λ T = (λ T1 , . . . ,λ TN ), µT = (µT1 , . . . ,µTL )) one can seek such
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coordinating values λC and µC of λ and µ for which the
coupling constraints (3) and the resource constraints (4) are
satisﬁed, that is for i = 1, . . . ,N
yi(λC,µC) = Fi
(
xi(λC,µC),ui(λC,µC)
)
,
ui(λC,µC) = ∑
j
Hi jy j(λC,µC), (6)
∑
i
rli(xi(λC,µC))≤ cl , l = 1, . . . ,L, (7)
µCl ≥ 0, µCl
[
∑
i
rli(xi(λC, pC))−cl
]
=0, l = 1, . . . ,L. (8)
The above conditions (7) and (8) result from the require-
ment to satisfy overall optimality conditions. It simple
terms they state that the optimal prices of the resources
must be nonnegative and that a positive price can be
charged for the commonly available resource only when
this resource is fully utilized, i.e., when the respective re-
source constraint is active. It should be observed that some
or even all values of the components of λCi may be nega-
tive. The assumption about the uniqueness property of the
local problem solutions – for given price vectors µ and λ –
is an essential one [4] for the conditions guaranteeing the
existence of the coordinating prices λC, µC. If these solu-
tions do not have this property, then the coordinating prices
satisfying eqns. (6)–(8) may easily not exist. One could
expect that the lack of uniqueness of xi(λ ,µ), ui(λ ,µ) for
an isolated point (λ 0,µ0), µ0 ≥ 0 should not matter too
much. Alas, it is easy to demonstrate with many impor-
tant examples that if the local solutions are not unique for
some pair (λ 0,µ0), they are also not unique for any pair
(λ ,µ) that could satisfy the coordinating conditions. Now,
the simple suﬃcient conditions guaranteeing the unique-
ness of xi(λ ,µ), ui(λ ,µ) (and hence of yi(λ ,µ)) for any
feasible pair (λ ,µ) are: the strict concavity of the function
Ui(xi,ui,yi) with respect to its arguments, linearity of Fi
and the convexity of rli and of the set Ii. More general
conditions can also be given [5], [8] but in a general non-
linear case the desirable uniqueness property of the local
problem solutions is, unfortunately, not easily achievable.
Assuming the existence of λC,µC, one can propose a num-
ber of algorithms for iterating the values of λ , µ . The basic
strategy is to use the following gradient method:
λ (k+1)i = λ
(k)
i +γ
[
ui(λ (k),µ (k))−∑
j
Hi jy j(λ (k),µ (k))
]
, (9)
µ (k+1)l =
{
µ (k)l + γ
[
∑
i
rli(xi(λ (k),µ (k)))− cl
]}
+
(10)
for i = 1, . . . ,N, l = 1, . . . ,L, where γ is a positive step
size, and k is the iteration index. The algorithm deﬁned
by (9) and (10) is a gradient strategy – with price projection
on the feasible range – since, assuming the uniqueness of
xi(λ ,µ), ui(λ ,µ) for every feasible pair (λ ,µ) and each i,
the expressions in square brackets in (9), (10) are the slopes
(with minus sign) of the dual function deﬁned as the sum
of the maximum local performance values Eq. (5) minus
the term ∑l µ (k)l cl . The dual function attains its minimum
at λC, µC.
The above price adjustment strategy will converge for suf-
ﬁciently small value of γ if all local utility functions are
strongly concave, functions Fi are linear, functions rli are
convex, sets Ii are convex and there exists a feasible point
satisfying all the constraints, such that all the inequal-
ity constraints are inactive. Algorithm (9) and (10) has
a distributed character. In particular, the adjustments of the
resource prices µl can be performed for each price inde-
pendently from the other price adjustments. This property
appears to be most useful.
3. Network congestion control and
price-based schemes
With Internet, the Price Method has found a large-scale
system for which this method seems to be quite well
suited. In several congestion control mechanisms, as re-
cently proposed [9]–[14], the network is represented by
S traﬃc sources, representing particular source-destination
pairs, and a grid of a set of L links. The links, together
with associated routers, are the network resources, of lim-
ited traﬃc carrying capacity cl . Each source i is supposed
to use a set L(i) ⊆ L of links, and has at time k an as-
sociated transmission rate xi; the set of transmission rates
determines the aggregate ﬂow yl(k) through each link, by
the equation:
yl(k) = ∑
i∈S(l)
xi(k), (11)
where S(l) is the set of all sources transmitting through
the link l. Then, the feedback mechanism communicates
to sources the congestion information about the network.
This congestion measure – the price pl(k) – is a positive
valued quantity associated with link l. The fundamental as-
sumption is made that sources have access to the aggregate
price (qi(k), i = 1, . . . ,S) of all links in their route:
qi(k) = ∑
l∈L(i)
pl(k). (12)
4. Network Control by Price Instruments,
Application of Price Method
Let us consider the network with S sources and L links.
Assume now that the traﬃc sources (or source-destination
pairs) are indeed utility oriented, i.e., they have utilities
Ui(xi) expressed in monetary terms and are willing to max-
imize proﬁts equal to utility minus payment charged by the
network. Then, the equilibrium rate xsei will solve the fol-
lowing local source problem:
max
xi
[Ui(xi)−qsei xi], (13)
where qsei = ∑
l∈L(i)
psel and p
se denotes vector of equilib-
rium prices. The role of prices p is to coordinate the ac-
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tions of the individual sources; in fact to ensure that solu-
tions of (13) together solve the network ﬂow optimization
problem
max
x≥0 ∑i Ui(xi) subject to ∑i∈S(l)xi ≤ cl, l = 1, . . . ,L , (14)
where cl is the lth link capacity. This is particular, simple
instant of problem (1)–(4). Hence, it would seem possible –
at least in theory – to propose the following congestion
control scheme: for given link prices pl(k), l = 1, . . . ,L, at
time k, the sources solve local problems
max
xi∈Ii
[Ui(xi)−qi(k)xi] , (15)
where Ii = [xmini ,xmaxi ]. The solutions xsi (k) = xi(qi(k)) are
signaled to all concerned links, which then adjust their link
prices – for the next iteration k + 1 – according to the fol-
lowing rule
p(k+1)l =
{
p(k)l + γ
[
∑
i∈S(l)
xsi (k)− cl
]}
+
(16)
and is a positive step – chosen to allow the scheme to
converge. Then the new link prices are signaled to links,
etc., until the convergence is obtained.
5. Dynamic Routing
Although it would require a serious modiﬁcation of Inter-
net protocols to implement the described scheme of coor-
dination by price instruments in a distributed manner, this
algorithm can be instead used by the centralized controller,
so called bandwidth broker. One can observe, that further
improvement of the proﬁt can be achieved by conscious
choice of routing, in the systems with redundant paths ex-
isting between nodes. Here is an additional proﬁt of using
price instruments for network coordination. Equilibrium
prices pl , calculated in the process of network balancing
can be interpreted as link congestion indicators. As such
they can be used by external shortest-path routing algo-
rithm.
There is a problem connected with this approach. The cal-
culation of routes based on dynamic metrices leads to the
change in the load pattern, and necessity of re-calculating
allocations, and so on. In other words it may lead to oscil-
lations, what was observed in experiments. To avoid this
problem, time scales of routing and bandwidth allocation
have to be separated. For example, rerouting can be per-
formed every few minutes.
The following rerouting scheme is proposed:
Step 0: Sort the list of active sources in descending order
w.r.t. xmaxi .
Step 1: Choose the ﬁrst element from the sorted list and
ﬁnd a shortest length route for it using Dijkstra
algorithm, basing on dynamic metrices deﬁned in
Eq. (17); remove this source from the list.
Step 2: Calculate the new equilibrium prices pattern of the
network solving the problem (15)–(16), update the
metrices.
Step 3: Proceed until the route is found for every pair
source-destination.
The critical issue is to propose an additive metric for the
shortest length search. It must be a scalar value, bound
to the link, which incorporates information about the path
load and capacity at the same time. Finally, the proposed
dynamic metric dl includes the congestion prices, and takes
the form:
dl = pl + αβ e−
cl
cmax , α ∈< 0,1 >, (17)
where cmax is the highest link capacity in the network,
β = maxi∈S xmaxi . Equation (17) takes into account, that
at the initial iterations the network is “empty”, and none
links are congested – thus pl = 0. The exponential term
reﬂects the fact, that capacity is a non-additive metric, that
must be dealt with by shortest-path algorithm. In this case
the routes with the highest capacities are occupied in the
ﬁrst place by the source-destination pairs with the highest
transmission rates.
6. Results of Experiments
The simulation experiments were performed for a simple
network conﬁguration. Six sources were connected to the
network presented in Fig. 1. All were assumed to trans-
Fig. 1. Test network.
mit to the same destination, symbolized with a dark cir-
cle. The sources compete for the bandwidth of two bot-
tlenecks (link 8 and link 9). Two algorithms for the band-
width broker were compared, one that gives an optimal
solution of the bandwidth allocation problem – mixed in-
teger programming (MIP), and price-based scheme de-
scribed in the previous section. The aggregate utilities were
calculated.
The response of bandwidth broker is presented in Table 1.
Both the MIP and price-based algorithm gave the same
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result in – value of the utility function in both cases
was 1659.4. This result was obtained under the assumption
that all sources in the initial stage were sorted. For com-
parison in Table 1 (right-hand side) the performance of
a modiﬁed price-based algorithm is presented, in which
Table 1
Links and rates, MIP, and price-based algorithm with
sorting (left), price-based algorithm without sorting (right)
With sorting Without sorting
s link numbers rate (x) link’ numbers rate’ (x)
0 6; 8 15.00 6; 8 19.00
1 9; 10 11.25 6; 8 14.00
2 9; 10 6.25 6; 8 9.00
3 7; 9 6.25 8; 11 9.00
4 8; 11 45.00 9; 7 30.00
5 7; 9 6.25 8; 11 9.00
U(x) 1659.4 1510.0
only the Lagrange multipliers are used to represent link
costs (metrics). No sorting was performed in the initial
stage in this case. The obtained value of the utility function
was 1510.0.
7. Final Remarks
In this paper the objective was to present various selected
approaches to pricing, in particular concerned with the
classical role of prices in balancing markets and systems
in view of limited resources. The formulation and the
main properties of the Price Method were reviewed. This
method, developed with various modiﬁcations in the 1970-
ties, still receives much attention. To illustrate this point
possible application of the price-based mechanisms to Inter-
net congestion control was discussed. In fact the size and
the problems with operation of the Internet motivate the
renewed interest in those mechanisms. The pricing “tech-
nology” is very much needed to control modern communi-
cations because there do not exist other optimization based
technologies that could cope with the challenges oﬀered by
the Network.
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